Globalization is actually…not global. Palestinians living in the occupied Palestinian territories (OPT) are on the brink of being excluded from history in their own Diaspora within their own country. They are in the process of being literally written off the map because of the effects of what Jan Nederveen Pieterse calls “uneven globalization” (2004, p. 30) and the shattered potential of a borderless world.
As Pieterse points out, “…contemporary globalization refers to the exclusion of the majority of humanity…” (Ibid) where the world is parsed out between who has access to globalization and who has not. In the contemporary world where information is the “raw material” (Castells, 1996, p. 61) holding the key to development, not vice-versa, the Palestinians operate with on enormous deficit. Pieterse explains this “cultural differentialism translates into a policy of closure and apartheid. If the outsiders are let in at all, they are preferably kept at arm’s length in ghettos, reservations, or concentration zones” (p. 56). He clarifies this “paradigm of differentialism” (Ibid) by saying it follows the principle of purity in blood, lineage, or race (p. 56) and evidence of this lies in Israel’s separation-like behavior toward the Palestinians. Robert D. Kaplan, National Correspondent at The Atlantic, describes this “bifurcated world” more succinctly as “part of the globe is inhabited by…Fukuyama’s Last Man, healthy, well fed and pampered by technology. The other, larger, part is inhabited by Hobbes’s First Man, condemned to a life that is ‘poor, nasty, brutish, and short’” (2000, p. 24).
In the OPT, the imbalance is salient; Palestinians are economically, socially, physically, technologically, geographically and politically hemmed in and shut out from globalization. Natural resources are scarce in the region and subsequently the people depend on trade. Israel became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, however the membership benefits do not extend to Palestinians living there (WTO, n.d.). A glimpse at the The World Factbook, an online repository containing data on every country in the world, notes industries in the OPT are “generally small family businesses that produce cement, textiles, soap, olive-wood carvings, and mother-of-pearl souvenirs” (World Factbook-West Bank). These products are mainly sold to tourists in the souks of the OPT, not as goods to a global marketplace. Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on the other hand, indicates, “Israel has matured into a knowledge-based economy with internationally competitive telecommunications, IT, electronics, and life sciences industries” capitalizing on its skilled and educated workers. The MFA also boasts a “highly developed infrastructure and investor-friendly business environment” as well as its enormous growth in the high-tech industry (MFA, 2005). While Israel enjoys free trade with such partners as Mexico, Canada, the USA and the EU, through WTO membership, (WTO) the OPT shares its exports with…well, Israel.
Commercial airports in the OPT? None. Commercial seaports, with Gaza perched on 40km of coastline on the Mediterranean? Zero. The fact is, despite the internationally-recognized Palestinian Authority (PA) as the governing body of Palestinians, the Israel government controls nearly everything, including land, sea and air, blocking the import and export of goods and people, to and from the OPT. Palestinians even require Israeli-issued permits to sometimes access their own land, among other complicated and random procedures involving their movement (UN-OCHA, 2005; RAND, 2005; & B’tselem-Restrictions).
In 2002, Israel’s government approved and began building a barrier to protect Israeli citizens from terrorists, but in reality, the barrier acquisitions land from the Palestinians which is subsequently absorbed into Israeli settlements. This barrier and corresponding settlements (both declared illegal by UN Security Resolutions), since their construction have swallowed thousands of acres of Palestinian land. In addition, maps of the barrier’s route show a contiguous state for Israel, and a divided community of Palestinians; At its completion, the barrier will affect around 1/2 million Palestinians. (Lein and Cohen-Lifshitz, 2005 and RAND, p.381). With the map of their country a minefield and the map key reflecting a new language to signify the diversity of barriers put there, the territory of the OPT has become “…a reflection of the map” not a map which reflects the existing land. (Bauman, 1998, p. 35) MAP.
During the time the barrier was being built, there was a dramatic increase in foreign investment to Israel. The MFA reported from 1992 foreign investment in Israel was $537 million. In 2004 it grew to $5.3 billion. (MFA) Meanwhile, the land confiscation impoverished the Palestinians further by obstructing access to their land and their jobs (B’tslem-Restrictions). In 2000, poverty affected 22% of Palestinians; In 2004, it rose to 47% (UN-OCHA, 2004) and by 2006 it is expected to reach 72% mainly due to border closings (United Nations Consolidation Appeals Process, 2005, p. 5).
According to The World Factbook, out of 3.9 million Palestinians – who also have one of the highest birthrates in the world – (RAND, p.16) only 160,000 have access to the Internet, whereas in Israel, at least half the population is online, with downtown Jerusalem gone WiFi. The World Factbook’s general assessment of Israel’s telephone system is the “most highly developed system in the Middle East…” (World Factbook-Israel; Gaza; West Bank). Cellular phone coverage remains dismal and segregated in the OPT; Placing calls outside the OPT requires a separate phone with an Israeli service provider which is difficult for Palestinians to obtain (Hereni, et al., 2005).
Moreover, the Basic Laws of Israel only protect Israelis regarding human rights, freedom of movement, and ownership of land (Knesset, n.d.). These same laws actually restrict PA governance as well. In addition, Palestinians detained by Israel, are tried in a military court with no due process (B’tselem-Administrative Detention). Palestinians are forbidden to fly their national flag, drive on Israeli settler roads (Hereni, et al.), must obtain their electricity from Israel, (RAND). Finally, the names of their ancestral villages have been stricken from official maps of Israel. To say Palestinians are excluded from globalization is an understatement.
The barrier built by Israel is the ultimate line drawn in the sand, an impermeable physical reminder of the vulnerability of Palestinians and a blank faced denial of their access to the benefits of globalization, where, as Kaplan (2000) alluded to, the Last Man stares with dull superiority across the divide to the First Man and a world of chaos…where the chosen ones remain opposite the invisible ones.
With September 11, 2001 came sweeping pronouncements and Kantian-loaded speeches from U.S. President, George W. Bush; “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Bush, 2001). Suddenly, the borderless world of globalization reverted back to the physical world. Geography became relevant again as people hunkered down in their homes in fear and the previous gleeful economic interconnectedness of the globals (Bauman) disappeared faster than a mouseclick. What arose from the ashcan of the World Trade Center was a shift in globalization – the invisibles make themselves visible and a resounding us-against-them mentality ensued. Out of the clear blue sky (of NYC), the locals were no longer at arms length.
Fast-forward to 2005 and Hamas’ election to Palestinian parliament. One direct result of their election was an embargo on aid by the Middle East Quartet. After 9/11, Hamas fell under the gill net of the war on terror and the Roadmap for Peace, became a roadblock. Phase I of the edict called for Palestinian leadership to issue an “unequivocal statement reiterating Israel’s right to exist” (U.S Dept. of State, 2003) however, this leadership refused to comply. The ultimatum backed Hamas and the Palestinians, none of whom were involved in the creation of the Roadmap, into the metaphorical corner, facing financial blackmail of the globals. Freedom of choice, which they thought they were making in their elections, became choose us (the globals) or them (the locals-Hamas).
With a “space war” (Bauman, p. 27 ff.) occurring within their own communities, the Palestinians are still expected to choose the very thing which seemingly has nailed them up against the literal wall – the globals’ version of democracy by accepting Israel’s right to exist. It wouldn’t be as much of an imposition if Palestinians were privy to globalization and the accepted precondition of democracy (or at the very least, a say in the wording of the Roadmap). In other words, it’s not only the exclusion of globalization which makes them vulnerable, it is the expectation imposed upon them by the globals, despite the exclusion, which is an additional liability specific to the situation in the Middle East.
An illustration en pointe is when Thomas Homer-Dixon (Director of the Center for the Study of Peace and Conflict at the University of Toronto) quips, quoting Daniel Deudney, “Think of the a stretch limo in the potholed streets of New York City, where homeless beggars live. Inside the limo are the air-conditioned postindustrial regions…with their trade summitry and computer-information highways. Outside is the rest of mankind, going in a completely different direction.” (Kaplan, p.24). How can dialogue begin when there is an enormous crevice between Israelis and Palestinians, where concrete walls are built between families and jobs, when physical movement is obstructed by sharpshooters, where Palestinians are within reach (a stone’s throw) of the message but not the action (Pieterse), where the globals are literally on the other side of the paved road “simultaneously inaccessible and within sight” (Bauman, p. 54). How can Palestinians form the globals’ version of a democratic government, when one half of their “state” is inaccessible to the other and democracy is imposed, not generated from within their society? And further, if Israel is the example of democracy in the Middle East, what then is democracy? For the Palestinians, it seems there can be no Network Society (Castells) if there isn’t even a network. September 11th may have been a catalyst for peace in the region or a prescription for apartheid, but one thing for sure: it brought the physical world into the borderless world where the hierarchy of the Panoptipcon (Bauman, p. 34) was destroyed. Perhaps 9/11 generated a new version of globalization, where the people outside Homer-Dixon’s limo, use the power of the globals to create a new meaning of interconnectedness…a world where the globals (Israelis) must be validated or “recognized” by the locals (Palestinians).
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